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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
QUINN GARNER SIMMONS,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 42796
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2013-12168
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Quinn Simmons pled guilty to one count of
aggravated battery. He received a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
The district court initially retained jurisdiction, but, following his rider, the district court
relinquished jurisdiction.

On appeal, Mr. Simmons contends that the district court

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, in relinquishing its jurisdiction,
and in failing to reduce his sentence or place him on probation in light of the additional
information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule
35) motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In the evening on August 30, 2013, law enforcement was dispatched to a
residence. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.20.) Upon arriving,
the officers observed a man sitting on the front porch of the residence with a laceration
on the back of his head. (PSI, p.20; R., p.54.) Officers learned that the man’s wife’s exhusband, Quinn Simmons, had driven his car onto the man’s lawn and struck him with
his car. (PSI, p.21.) The car’s bumper hit the man and caused him to fall, striking his
head. (PSI, p.21.) He also suffered a fracture to the leg, an injured knee, and various
cuts and bruises. (PSI, p.23; R., p.54.) Mr. Simmons’ ex-wife was also present at the
scene but moved out of the way when Mr. Simmons drove the car onto the lawn. (PSI,
pp.21, 61.) Mr. Simmons’ two youngest children were in the house, but they came
outside after Mr. Worthington was injured. (PSI, pp.21, 31, 61.) Although Mr. Simmons
told law enforcement it was an accident—that he had merely meant to pull a short
distance onto the lawn but he misjudged his speed—Mr. Simmons was charged by
information with one count of aggravated battery, one count of attempted aggravated
battery, a deadly weapon enhancement, and one count of misdemeanor disturbing the
peace. (R., pp.53-55; PSI, p.21.)
On February 26, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Simmons entered an
Alford2 plea to the aggravated battery charge. (2/26/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-14; R., pp.83-90.)
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and
sentencing enhancements and to recommend a sentence of no more than fifteen years,
Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped
with the electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendums to the
PSI, the anger evaluation, and letters submitted in support of Mr. Simmons.
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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with five years fixed. (R., pp.83-90.) The district court accepted the plea and ordered a
Presentence Investigation and an anger evaluation. (2/26/14 Tr., p.19, L.18 – p.20,
L.11.) The matter was set for sentencing. (2/26/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.11-12.)
At sentencing, the prosecutor asked the district court to impose a sentence of
fifteen years, with five years fixed. (6/25/14 Tr., p.39, Ls.13-16.) Defense counsel
asked for five years, with one year fixed, and probation. (6/25/14 Tr., p.50, L.25 – p.51,
L.2, p.55, L.19 – p.56, L.3.) The district court sentenced Mr. Simmons to a unified
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction over him for a
period of up to 365 days.3 (6/25/14 Tr., p.63, Ls.7-22.; R., pp.105-109.)
On November 5, 2014, after a hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction
and ordered Mr. Simmons to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.
(R., pp.115-118.) On December 15, 2014, Mr. Simmons filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
(R., pp.121-123.)
Mr. Simmons then filed a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion (hereinafter, Rule 35) seeking a
reduction of his sentence and requesting leave to submit additional information for the
court’s consideration in support of his motion.

(Motion for Reduction of Sentence

Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.12, Ex. B, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.) The State
filed an objection to Mr. Simmons’ motion. (State’s Objection to Defendant’s Motion for
Reduction of Sentence, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.) The district court
denied Mr. Simmons’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (Memorandum Decision and
Order Re:

Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)

In so doing, the district court said, “I am retaining jurisdiction in this case for evaluation
purposes only. . . I want to have the department of corrections more carefully evaluate
you for risk of future violence, especially risk of future violence in this dysfunctional
family setting that you have.” (6/25/14 Tr., p.63, L.16 – p.64, L.1.)
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Mr. Simmons appeals from the judgment of conviction, the order relinquishing
jurisdiction, and the district court’s order denying Mr. Simmons’s I.C.R. 35 motion.
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Simmons following his plea of guilty to
one count of aggravated battery?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Simmons?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Simmons’ Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion in light of the new information provided in support
thereof?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Simmons A
Sentence For Aggravated Battery That Is Excessive Given Any View Of The Facts
Mr. Simmons asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). On appeal, the focus of review is
4

upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Bayles, 131
Idaho 624, 627 (Ct. App. 1998).

Mr. Simmons does not allege that his sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum. As the sentence is not illegal, Mr. Simmons must
show that the sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary objective of
protecting society and the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Id.
One aspect that should have received the attention of the district court is the fact
that Mr. Simmons has strong support from family members. See State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his
family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Simmons’ mother and father each
wrote a letter in support of their son. (PSI, pp.34, 80-81.) Mr. Simmons is also close to
his stepfather. (PSI, pp.34, 82.) Further, Mr. Simmons is an Eagle Scout, and the
district court received half-a-dozen letters from community members showing support
for Mr. Simmons. (PSI, pp.34, 83-89.)
Another fact that the district court should have more fully considered is the fact
that Mr. Simmons is 46 years old and had no criminal convictions prior to this incident.
(PSI, pp.32, 104.) The Idaho Supreme Court has “recognized that the first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.”

State v.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402
(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see
also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two counts of drawing a check without
funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pled guilty to the charge of
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and

5

Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the defendants had no
prior felony convictions.

Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90.

The

Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the
absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in
imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673.
Here, Mr. Simmons had never been convicted of a crime prior to this incident. In
fact, Mr. Simmons is the antithesis of a career criminal. He owned his own home, held
steady employment, and has virtually no criminal history. He graduated from Utah State
University with a degree in business administration. (PSI, pp.4, 36-37.) Mr. Simmons
has no unexplained gaps in employment; he most recently worked for Tom Scott
Toyota. (PSI, pp.4, 37.) Prior to that employment, Mr. Simmons was employed as a
contract analyst for St. Luke’s from November 2012 to March of 2014, but was
terminated due to the instant offense. (PSI, pp.37-38.) Prior to his employment as a
contract analyst, Mr. Simmons worked as a commodity manager for Volm Companies
for 12 years. (PSI, p.38.) Mr. Simmons has also held various positions within the
community—such as a member and chairperson of the Ammon, Idaho, planning and
zoning commission. (PSI, pp.80, 87; 6/25/14 Tr., p.52, Ls.8-9.) Idaho recognizes that
good employment history should be considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice,
103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).
A mental health evaluation revealed that Mr. Simmons may suffer from a
personality disorder.

(PSI, p.9.)

It was recommended that Mr. Simmons receive

counseling to help him learn healthy coping skills and cognitive behavior treatment to
help him deal with his anger. (PSI, pp.5, 15.) Mr. Simmons is aware that anger is a
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problem for him and proactively attended counseling until his current period of
incarceration. (PSI, pp.39, 41, 125-126; 6/25/14 Tr., p.51, Ls.5-8.) Yet, Mr. Simmons
was found to be in the low risk range for future general violence by Dr. Bill Arnold, the
psychologist who performed an anger evaluation of Mr. Simmons. (PSI, p.15.) In fact,
Mr. Simmons scored extremely low for verbal aggression and was in the grossly
average range for aggressive attitude and physical aggression which indicates that he is
in the normal community range. (PSI, p.15.)
Further, Mr. Simmons expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his
acts. (2/26/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-14; 6/25/14 Tr., p.57, L.14 – p.58, L.9; PSI, p.41.) Idaho
recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his
conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595
(1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Simmons took full
responsibility for his actions. (2/26/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-14; 6/25/14 Tr., p.57, L.14 – p.58,
L.9.)
The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has
been addressed in several cases. For example, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204
(Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when
the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem,
his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.” Id. at
209. Mr. Simmons is very remorseful about the incident. He wants to practice better
impulse control and to learn more patience “so nothing like this ever happens again.”
(PSI, p.41.) He wrote to the court:
I would like to apologize to this court, Holly, Blake, and my kids for the
pain, mental anguish, and shame I have caused them and that my actions
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have brought us here today. I am ashamed to admit what I have done. I
know that I showed incredibly poor judgement putting my car in motion
towards Blake. While I never intended any harm and only wanted to show
that they didn’t control me, I am responsible for the results of my actions
and consequently have lost even more control of my own life.
I am indeed grateful that it wasn’t any worse. I can’t adequately express
the sorrow I have over this incident. I would do anything to get back that
instant when I decided to drive onto their grass. I live every day with
constant regret and a desire to repair the damage I have caused.
Because of my actions I lost my job, the rights to see my kids, and my
dignity. I hope to one day repair those relationships and be able to see
my kids again.
(PSI, p.41.)
At sentencing, Mr. Simmons again apologized to the victims and his family for his
conduct and the effect(s) it had on them.

(6/25/14 Tr., p.57, L.15 – p.58, L.9.)

Mr. Simmons told the court:
I would like to take this opportunity, when I address the Court, to express
how sorry I am for the pain that I know that I’ve caused to Blake and to his
family as well as to my family and my friends and how this has affected – it
has rippled through so many people’s lives and I am sorry for it.
I know my actions were childish and dangerous and reckless. And if I
could take them back, I would do it; if I would have taken just a minute
longer to think about it, done something differently at that moment.
(6/25/14 Tr., p.57, L.15 – p.58, L.1.)
Ultimately, Mr. Simmons was an upstanding citizen who, after a 13 year
marriage, went through a difficult divorce which resulted in a fractured family unit and an
extremely contentious relationship between him and his ex-wife and her new husband.
(PSI, pp.48-53, 58.)

They had a long history of provoking each other.

(6/25/14

Tr., p.25, L.1 – p.33, L.9, p.40, L.15 – p.44, L.24; PSI, pp.48-53, 58.) Less than an hour
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before the incident, she sent Mr. Simmons over a dozen angry text messages prior to
his arrival at her house. (PSI, pp.59-60.)
Mr. Simmons asserts that the court abused its discretion by not fully considering
all of the mitigating facts described herein. Mr. Simmons asserts that, given any view of
the facts, his unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, is excessive.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Simmons
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.

State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). “The decision to place a defendant on probation or
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of that discretion.”

State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App.

2010). Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original
judgment. Id. at 289.
Mr. Simmons contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing
jurisdiction in light of his successful period of retained jurisdiction, his recognition of a
problem, and his progress in making the changes necessary so that this type of incident
does not happen again.
Mr. Simmons had an excellent rider.

Notably, the Idaho Department of

Correction’s program manager recommended probation for Mr. Simmons. (PSI, p.111.)
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Through his programming, Mr. Simmons “developed a significant amount of insight into
his controlling behavior.” (PSI, p.114.) He stopped seeing himself as a victim, and
realized that a person who identified with being a victim could not correct what he
refused to see as a choice. (PSI, p.114.) One of Mr. Simmons’ facilitators wrote, “I am
encouraged by Mr. Simmons’ progress during his ‘A New Direction’ programing and
believe that he is a good candidate for probation; he has risen to every behavioral
expectation and appears to have a sincere desire to do well in the community.” (PSI,
p.114.) In addition to his participation in class, Mr. Simmons volunteered as a math
tutor and received glowing remarks from his supervisor. (PSI, p.114.) Mr. Simmons
also went above and beyond outside the classroom by volunteering to unload the
weekly Sysco truck. (PSI, p.118.)
At the rider review hearing, Mr. Simmons told the district court:
When we came to court last time I felt like I had accepted responsibility for
what I had done. And when I was sentenced to and given the chance to
go to a rider, honestly, I was – I was disappointed.
When I – one of the first things I did when I went to the rider was – you
have to write down everything that you’ve ever done that’s ever been bad
and what the consequences were and what the payoffs were. And I’ll tell
you, nothing makes you feel like a dirtball more than reliving everything
that you’ve done and the consequences and how it’s affected everyone.
(11/5/14 Tr., p.83, Ls.13-23.) Mr. Simmons also talked about what he learned on the
rider—things he learned about himself and how to modify and control his own emotions.
(11/5/14 Tr., p.83, L.24 – p.86, L.6.)
The district court relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Simmons even though the
specialist recommended probation based on Mr. Simmons’ progress on the rider. (PSI,
p.111.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Simmons, not because of
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anything Mr. Simmons did or did not do on his rider, but because the district court did
not feel that it had received sufficient additional evaluation(s) of Mr. Simmons in order to
better know the risk he would pose if he was placed in the community.

(11/5/14

Tr., p.86, L.13 – p.89, L.9.) The district court concluded that it had not obtained any
better insight into the risk Mr. Simmons would pose in the community, and relinquished
jurisdiction, saying it did not trust Mr. Simmons in the community. (11/5/14 Tr., p.89,
L.10 - p.91, L.4.)
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Simmons’s accomplishments while
on the retained jurisdiction would equate to a successful probation when it relinquished
its jurisdiction over Mr. Simmons. Ultimately, the district court relinquished jurisdiction
due to the Idaho Department of Correction’s failure to further evaluate Mr. Simmons’
risk to the community—circumstances entirely beyond his control—and such was an
abuse of discretion.
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court
that demonstrates Mr. Simmons’ genuine remorse, personal growth, and ability to
conform his conduct as required, the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Simmons.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Simmons’ Rule 35 Motion
In Light Of The New Information Offered
Mr. Simmons asserts that the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence
modification represents an abuse of discretion.
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A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
Mr. Simmons asserts that he should have been placed on probation or his
sentence reduced in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule
35 motion. Mr. Simmons asserts the district court’s denial of his motion for modification
of his sentence represents an abuse of discretion.
In support of his motion for sentence reduction, Mr. Simmons submitted
information that he had sold his home in Meridian and would not move back to that
community within which his ex-wife and her family reside, but would move 330 miles
away, to Bountiful, Utah, to work for his uncle.

(Motion for Reduction of Sentence

Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.6, Ex. C, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
Further, Mr. Simmons has acquiesced to the unfortunate situation with his
children. He is aware that they do not wish to see him at this time, and he does not
intend to initiate any type of visitation with them, until they wish to pursue it in the future.
(Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.7, attached to 12/7/15
Motion to Augment.) Thus, Mr. Simmons no longer has any reason for which to contact
his ex-wife, and without such contact, Mr. Simmons would not have occasion for future

12

anger outbursts. (Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.7, attached
to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
Finally, the district court did not realize that Mr. Simmons was out in the
community pending sentencing for 10 months, and he did not initiate any contact with
his ex-wife during that period of time, thus demonstrating the absence of risk to her and
her family.4 (Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.7, attached to
12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
In addition to the lack of risk to the family, while at the Idaho Department of
Correction, Mr. Simmons has remained free from disciplinary action.

(Motion for

Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.9, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to
Augment.)
Where the district court was concerned that 140 days of incarceration was not
sufficient punishment, Mr. Simmons’ counsel pointed out in the Rule 35 motion that he
had now been incarcerated for a substantial period of time. (Motion for Reduction of
Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, pp.10-11, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
This additional period of incarceration should have satisfied the district court’s desire to
longer punish Mr. Simmons.
Mr. Simmons has paid the entirety of the restitution due to Mr. Worthington.
(Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.11, attached to 12/7/15
Motion to Augment.)

Mr. Simmons’ ex-wife did see him at their son’s tennis match, but the resulting
allegation of violating a protection order was dismissed. (Motion for Reduction of
Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.8, Ex. D, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
4

13

Finally, Mr. Simmons wrote a compelling letter to the district court in which he
described not only his remorse, but also his additional efforts at self-improvement,
including attending multiple classes and working as a teacher’s assistant for the GED
program.

(Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, p.12, Ex. B,

attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
In its written decision on the Rule 35 motion, the district court noted that it
relinquished jurisdiction due to the deficiencies in the programming decisions made by
the Idaho Department of Correction. Specifically, the district court wanted Mr. Simmons
to be placed in a conflict resolution pathway, but he was not. (Memorandum Decision
and Order Re:

Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion, p.2, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to

Augment.) Mr. Simmons was placed in a program directed at substance abuse, but he
did not have a drug or alcohol problem,5 and the court did not know whether
Mr. Simmons received cognitive self-change or moral recognition [sic] therapy.
(Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion, p.2, attached to
12/7/15 Motion to Augment.) However, the court concluded that the sentence was not
excessive, and denied the motion. (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant’s
Rule 35 Motion, pp.2-3, attached to 12/7/15 Motion to Augment.)
In light of the new and additional information submitted by Mr. Simmons in
support of his Rule 35 motion, in addition to the mitigating information already before
the court, the district court abused its discretion by not placing Mr. Simmons on
probation or reducing his sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion.
Although the “A New Direction” program is classified as a substance abuse program,
the program facilitator noted in the Addendum to the PSI that Mr. Simmons worked on
his criminal thinking and answered the addiction related questions from the perspective
of needing to feel in control. (PSI, pp.113-114.)

5
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Simmons respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it sees
fit or remand his case to the district court with an order that he be placed on probation.
Alternatively, Mr. Simmons requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a
new rider review hearing or that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and
the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 12th day of January, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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